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Was There Sex Before Calvin Klein?
Linda R. Hirshman*
Was there sex before Calvin Klein? This may seem like a pretty silly
question to ask. After all, here we are. Assuming that at least some of us
were born before 1980, when Brooke Shields announced her affinity for
jeans over nothing in the first of Calvin Klein's increasingly controversial
advertisements, one might conclude that there was, indeed, sex before
Calvin Klein. This matters to me because I am writing a book about the
history of the legal regulation of sexuality in America,' and it would
be a pretty short book if everything that mattered started a scant sixteen
years ago! But it turns out that things regarding sex are never simple.
There has been a fashion for some time in contemporary American and
European sexual history to hold that sex is not a natural urge, but a product
of social institutions. This school of thought denies that people feel sexy
because otherwise we would not reproduce, and there would be no people;
we would all just be a bunch of amoebas or something. In other words,
people feel sexy because someone like Calvin Klein told them they should.2
And there is a related belief that another seemingly universal and natural
phenomenon - the urge to push people around, which we call dominance -
is also not natural, but results from centuries of Western capitalism and other
competitive institutions.3 And because sex and dominance are not natural
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1. LINDA HIRSHMAN & JANE LARSON, AFTER VICE: POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE
LEGAL REGULATION OF SEXUALITY (forthcoming 1997).
2. The father of this school of thought is generally thought to be Michel Foucault.
See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert Hurley trans.,
Random House 1980) (1976).
3. My earliest authority for this theory is C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL
THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM (1962), but the role of culture in shaping personhood
dates back at least to Plato.
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in this tradition, we can make any kind of life we like for ourselves. We
just have to watch what we put in jeans ads.
In what follows, I am going to argue that there probably is an irreducible
minimum of other-sex sexual desires in the species because, after all, here
we are. And there probably is an accompanying desire to dominate other
human beings in the species because dominance is the universal theme of the
history of sexuality since the first writings appeared. In any event, if the
related inclinations of sex and dominance are not natural, they are so embedded
in our cultural history that theorizing - at least about Western politics -
without dominance is simply writing science fiction. And worse, the sexual
encounter, especially the male/female sexual encounter, is an ideal opportunity
for the exercise of dominance.4 And still worse, part of the payoff for sexual
exertion is the dominance payoff. But while sexy and domination-inclined,
we, the products of Western culture (and this probably is also a universal
human characteristic), desire to live in a civil society, not out there in the
situation of the universal dominance contest of all against all that political
theorists call the "state of nature." So the really interesting question is how
to use the power of cultural institutions - law, economics, art, religion -
to constrain the natural dominance, which is linked with sexuality, without
sacrificing the sexuality.
A. The Nature/Nurture Debate
Things were a lot easier before all this theorizing about the cultural
construction of sexuality replaced the basic birds-and-bees scenario. I first
learned of the cultural construction of all sexuality theory when giving a speech
at an interdisciplinary conference at an Ivy League university last year. In
that speech, I was talking about sex in the state of nature, that imaginary time
before there was a state or much in the way of institutions of culture, and
certainly before the concept of designer jeans. In state of nature theory there
is little differentiation between male and female. As with much of Western
political theory, the players in state of nature theory are imaginary characters
much more interested in power than in sex; let's call them ... men.
Anyway, I argued that if we recognized the existence of both men and
women in the imaginary state of nature, heterosexual sexual exchanges would
involve certain problems that did not surface in conventional state of nature
theories, which do not recognize the existence of male and female, but treat
4. The locus classicus for this insight is Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism,
Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515 (1982) and Catharine
A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence,
8 SIGNS 635 (1983).
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everyone as male. An audience member who I suspect came from the English
Department asked me why I thought there would be sex in the state of nature
at all. Michel Foucault, she announced, in a tone substantially reminiscent
of that normally reserved for references to the deity, had demonstrated beyond
cavil that sex was a social construct produced by society in a series of related
social exchanges to satisfy "society's" needs, for instance, for population
growth or control at any particular time. Sex is not a natural biological
inclination inherent in the species that reproduces heterosexually. No society.
No sex.
I was completely floored by this suggestion and, after long moments,
I finally sputtered, "But here we are." And here we are. She did not seem
obviously demented. What could be going on? One possibility is that our
primal ancestors, whatever they were, started creating sexy jeans advertise-
ments the moment they dropped out of the trees. But that seems improbable.
I admit that I had never read Foucault's work - on sexuality or anything
else. But I knew that he was famous for finding in texts from Classical Greece
evidence that the division of humanity into gay and straight categories was
a modem notion, that in Greece men would have both same-sex and other-sex
sexual exchanges without moral censure - shame being reserved in any given
encounter for not being the person on top.
As a longtime feminist, I have no trouble in recognizing the ancient
lineage of concern with who is on top. Indeed, since I started doing the re-
search for my current book, I learned to my delight that, after the Counter-
reformation, the Catholic Church devised an elaborate hierarchy of sexual
positions. Thinking, rightly or wrongly, that reproduction was a function
of the so-called "missionary" position, the Church categorized all other posi-
tions as venial sins, except for sex with the woman on top. That was a mortal
sin. But even if the division of sexuality between same-sex and other-sex
encounters were socially constructed, which it turns out is not exactly what
Foucault said, still there had to be some minimal desire for other-sex ex-
changes because here we are. But the suggestion just keeps coming up. It
turns out that La Rochefoucauld thought something similar. He asserted that
people would not fall in love unless they read about it first, truly a statement
for a product of the age of printing.
What is going on here? I am working with the writings and records of
the legal and social regulation of sexuality - old codes, old statutes, old moral
exhortations and analyses, the Bible - and the work assumes that there is
a bedrock of natural sexuality to be "regulated" by law and other technologies
of social governance. But if Foucault is right, then there is no sex there,
and the very laws that purport to regulate pre-existing biological reality actually
take people who are perfectly content to sit under a tree alone, and exhort
and instigate them to heterosexual activity by drawing it, writing it, talking
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about it, and putting it in their jeans ads. There is no natural bedrock of
sexuality, and things are pretty fluid.
The only constant in Foucauldian theories is that the people in power
keep trying to write the sexual script for the people out of power. The content
of sexuality will differ depending on how society fills in the blanks. Sex
will be a mixture, unfamiliar to post-Christian sensibilities, of gay and
straight, and of boys and wives in ancient cultures. Alternatively, sex will
be confessional and regulated by the Church's concern with positions in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, or confessed to on the psychiatric couch
and brought into being for the examination and classification of a Freudian
authority as normal or abnormal, depending on what the powers, that be in
Vienna would find palatable in the twentieth century. Setting aside the
problem of the cave men, women, and children, this has a certain explanatory
power. As I studied the history of the regulation of sexual access in the West,
it seemed to me that many things did indeed change over time and that it
is not unthinkable that, given other historical contingencies, things might
have been somewhat different even in the arguably "natural" realm of sex.
But in the end, I must believe that there is an irreducible minimum of
heterosexual desire in the species because here we are.
B. The Constant of Domination
I did find one constant, in addition to the presence of the human species
over time, and it is certainly not something that should have surprised
Foucault, who after all, thought that the powerful player in any given
relationship was using his power to cause the weaker player to experience
sexuality in a way that served the interest of the stronger player. I see the
constant and universal presence of the desire to dominate. From ancient
Greece to the photo studio of famed fashion photographer, Steven Meisel,
who shot those raunchy pictures for Calvin Klein and for Madonna's sex
book, everywhere you look, someone is on top and someone else is on the
bottom.
Foucault did not miss this. In his first volume of The History of
Sexuality, he describes the universality and the pervasiveness of the will to
dominate in marvelously graphic terms. "My main concern will be to locate
the forms of power," Foucault writes, "the channels it takes, the discourses
it permeates in order to reach the most tenuous and individual modes of
behavior, the paths that give it access to the rare or scarcely perceivable forms
of desire, how it penetrates and controls everyday pleasure . . . in short,
WAS THERE SEX BEFORE CALVIN KLEIN?
the 'polymorphous techniques of power. . .. "'5 As historian Lynn Hunt
so eloquently expressed, power is Foucault's virus.6
Many critics have noted that Foucault, the god of historical contextu-
alization of even seemingly natural phenomena like sex, thus inconsistently
embraces a universal constant - the perennial presence of power. Even more
interestingly, Foucault's power is a type and manifestation of power that is
very familiar to the post-Enlightenment thinker because it is manifestly
derived from the political theory of the founder of modem political thought,
Thomas Hobbes.7 The power both Hobbes and Foucault see is rooted in
the physical body, is pervasive in all human relationships rather than being
concentrated in the law or the king's decrees, and is the source of most human
behavior. Hobbes, writing in the materialist tradition of Descartes and Bacon,
describes all phenomena as ultimately material physical events. 8 Foucault
sees the material body as the situs of history. Hobbesian actors, driven by
the impact of material events on their imaginations, are as often as not set
into motion by their imaginings.9 In Foucault's world, the actions of powerful
actors set into motion interior understandings in human beings, and these
understandings establish people's lived reality, including their sexual reality.
Hobbesian imaginings are ultimately desire or aversion; humans will be driven
by desire to approach and by aversion to avoid other objects, including other
humans. Foucault's externally inspired imaginings include the construction
of categories of desire and aversion. Ceaselessly in motion, humans are also
and importantly nearly alike in power, such that they are ceaselessly a danger
to one another, and enact or reenact dramas of fear and dramas of desire.
In Foucault's world, power is a virus, spreading among all of us equally;
there is no monopoly on force.
One would think that the radical devolution of power from the monarchy
to the populace in the real world of political history or the viral spread of
power in Foucault's reconstruction of the history of sexuality would produce
some pretty scary results. Hobbes thought that the state of nature, in which
equal men are endlessly in motion, would be a state of war of every man
against every man. Each encounter is a possible occasion for violence; fearing
violence, each man is driven to strike first. Life is solitary, poor, nasty,
5. 1 FOUCAULT, supra note 2, at 11.
6. Lynn Hunt, Foucault's Subject in The History of Sexuality, in DiscouRSEs OF
SEXUALITY: FROM ARISTOTLE TO AIDS 78, 83 (Domna C. Stanton ed., 1992).
7. The historicism of Hobbesian man was the inspiration for MacPherson's seminal
work on the localism of Enlightenment theory generally, so it is striking that Foucault seems
to be making the same mistake. See generally MACPHERSON, supra note 3.
8. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651).
9. See id. at ch. VI.
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brutish, and short. The game theorists have a game to describe Hobbes's
problem: they call it the Prisoners' Dilemma.









But, one might assert, sex is not all violence and killing the other player
and taking what he or she has or is. If the parties would prefer to cooperate
over going their own way, say, because of the irreducible minimum of natural
sexual desire in the species, they will play a different game. Accordingly,
you can imagine how delighted I was when I learned that the game theorists
had devised a model for the next game down from the Prisoners' Dilemma,
which they called, completely without input from me, the Battle of the Sexes.
In the Battle of the Sexes, she wants to go to the ballet and he wants to go
to the prize fight. However, each would prefer to go to the other's enter-
tainment over going to his or her preferred entertainment alone.









Foucault's picture of sex is not even the Battle of the Sexes because he
does not see each player as desiring his own good and acting strategically to
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obtain it. Instead, Foucault's sex is, as Catharine MacKinnon described it,
"sexuality as the life and times of desiring man in bondage and being disciplined
and loving every minute of it, and loving his struggle to get out of it even
more."10 We can envision Foucault as not wanting to go to the prize fight
but instead, wanting to be disciplined into going to the ballet, struggling to
get out of his bondage for the fun of it rather than in a desire to see the fight.
So the fight is not a negative outcome for Foucault - he embraces the inter-
section of sex and dominance games, and he calls a truce in the Battle of the
Sexes.
This happy picture of a bondage game, I contend, can exist within a
Hobbesian framework of endless power-seeking only if the players are gen-
uinely equal, so that bondage remains a game. As we have seen in Hobbes's
world, perfect equality leads to the Prisoners' Dilemma. However, if the
players can forego killing each other because of the pull of sexuality and move
to the stage of the Battle of the Sexes, in Foucault's world, the game would
take the form of who gets to go first in constructing the other's sexuality, or
put another way, who gets to play domination and who gets to play submission.
This option is available to Foucault's players because, although they are
motivated to dominate, their domination inclination is moderated by their desire
to have sex rather than to kill or to enslave, their strength is so equal that only
taking turns will work, and finally, their chances of surviving a round of "tie
me up, tie me down" are pretty good. If they are not pretty close to equal,
but they would rather have sex than murder or enslavement, then the delightful
game of sexual construction will quickly turn to rape and other less appealing
forms of sex plus dominance.
There is only one way that such equality can be ensured in the natural
world, and that is exactly what Foucault did: he wrote his whole story of the
modem construction of sexuality without women. Or, where women appear,
it is without any of the will that characterizes his other players. In Foucault's
world of sex, men act and women are acted upon. And accordingly, because
the actors are roughly equal, Foucault and the other social constructionists
miss the threatening, scary, preemptive, and chilling centrality for women
of the one universal characteristic Foucault does recognize: the will to power,
or as we feminists put it, to dominance.
Was there sex before Calvin Klein and the other social institutions that
describe and invoke sexuality? Probably. Was there heterosexual dominance
between unequal players embedded in the sexual regimes before Calvin Klein?
Every organization of human heterosexuality that Foucault examines, or that
10. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Does Sexuality Have a History?, in DIscoURSES OF
SExuALrry: FROM ARISTOTLE TO AIDS, supra note 6, at 117, 119.
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I have examined in doing the work for my book, reflects the constant of
dominance. In the ancient Near East and in Jewish sex laws, men could have
many wives and they could patronize prostitutes. In Athens, men could have
concubines but the concubines had to come from a lower social order. In
Rome, the crime of fornication did not include sexual relations with concubines
and prostitutes. When Christianity appeared, with its assertions about equality
before God, dominance was seriously imperilled. Augustinian celibacy was
an important response to the radical equality immanent in early Christianity.
If women were going to be equal to men, sex would have to stop. I suggest
that the solution of reproductive monogamous marriage (better to marry than
to burn) was proposed to return women to their pre-Christian posture of
submission. Adultery was a crime of married females from the Code of
Hammurabi through nineteenth-century criminal law. For most of Western
history, until the nineteenth-century feminist movement, the age of consent
for sex was ten years of age. As I said, so consistently does the dominance
theme appear that it supports a good argument for the existence of some natural
heterosexuality and some natural inclination to dominate the weaker player
in a sexual transaction.
C. What Is to Be Done?
Several things might be said at this point. First, you notice that I
am talking only about Western history: Europe and the European colonies.
Second, I have not yet addressed the sexually liberated present day. So it is
possible, as critics have long said about Hobbes's work, that we are making
a universal subject out of bourgeois European males at the dawn of capitalism.II
Anthropologists keep coming up with - and then debunking - happy
islanders somewhere who lead a matrilineal or egalitarian life among
the coconuts without the Western institutions of private enforcement of rape
laws and death penalties for adultery, salvation tied to monogamous marriage,
and the concept of "opposite sexes." So far, the examples have turned out
to be far too elusive to support a meaningful political theory. But even
assuming they exist, I am not interested in them. As far as I am concerned,
for those of us inheritors or adopted children of the Western story, it is too
late. For natural or cultural historical reasons, male/female sexuality has been
linked with male dominance for at least five thousand years; we may not be
imprisoned in it for sociobiological reasons, but we would be fools not to
address it (as Foucault failed to address it). Even if it is not universal, and
therefore not "hard-wired" in a totalizing sense, certainly the prevalence
indicates that at least an inclination to heterosexual dominance is universal.
11. See MACPI-ERSON, supra note 3, at 9-106 (discussing Hobbes's political theories).
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So, let us address it. Let us assume that either because dominance is
natural or because dominance is part of the bedrock of our Judeo-Christian-
Greco-Roman-English-Protestant culture, it is the viral presence Foucault
described. And not just any virus - it is a venereal disease lurking in every
sexual interaction.
Sociobiologists would say that nothing is to be done. Boys will be boys;
they will rape and pillage and abandon their offspring. 2 So, as Queen Victoria
allegedly reminded her daughter on the eve of her marriage, "Just close your
eyes and think of England." Or relax and enjoy it, as the Village Voice
feminists and the Katie Roiphe feminists might say; 13 just drink your wine
and think of appearing on the cover of the New York Times with an article
about how there is no such thing as date rape and it is a good thing, too.14
The great philosopher of American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville,
and his contemporary interpreter, William Kristol, 15 say that rampant biological
male sexuality must be controlled and that the way to do it is for women to
sacrifice themselves to submission in monogamous marriage for the sake of
the American Republic. 16 Boys will be boys, unless women will be slaves.
Men are so disorderly, Tocqueville and Kristol say, that if they cannot exercise
their dominance in a rigid framework of monogamous marriage, they will be
unfit citizens for a liberal democracy. The only solution is for morally superior
women to marry them. And because there must always be one master in any
institution, including marriage, and men are stronger - there they are. I call
Tocqueville's and Kristol's prescription for female self-sacrifice in the interest
of the nation, "Close your eyes and think of Washington, D.C."
12. Will girls be girls? Being smaller, weaker, and vulnerable in childbirth and
nursing has constrained females from effectuating what I consider the universal human will
to dominance. Female strategies resulting from physical weakness are the subject of my
dissertation. See Linda R. Hirshman, Material Girls: A Game Theoretic Revision of the
Social Contract Exercise with Women Present (1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Illinois (Chicago)) (on file with University of Illinois (Chicago) Library). For
purposes of this lecture, I will focus on the more obvious problem of constraining the
stronger player.
13. See generally KATI ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER (1993) (debunking the move-
ment against date rape); PLEASURE AND DANGER (Carole S. Vance ed., 1984).
14. Katie Roiphe, Date Rape's Other Victim, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1993, at 16.
15. Chief of Staff for former Vice-President Dan Quayle, Kristol is often described
as Dan Quayle's "brain." Quayle caused a stir during the 1992 presidential campaign by
criticizing television's single woman heroine, Murphy Brown, for having a baby outside of
a monogamous marriage.
16. See generally 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, pt. ii, ch.3
(1835); William Kristol, Women's Liberation: The Relevance of Tocqueville, in INTERPRET-
ING TOCQUEVILLE's "DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA" 480 (Ken Masugi ed., 1991).
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On the other side of the coin, feminists who (unlike the youthful Ms.
Roiphe) do not think date rape is a good thing, prefer Foucault to the socio-
biologists because the idea that sex is socially constructed could also mean
that dominance is a cultural artifact and therefore, that sex with dominance
is a cultural construct. People of goodwill can get together and decide to
construct a sex without dominance through institutions other than Tocqueville's
and Kristol's marital slavery. Boys will not be boys, so to speak.
A plague on all their houses. First, a plague on the social constructionists.
Sex is natural. Here we are. The will to power is natural, or at least so
embedded in our cultural history as to be as much as natural. If the sexual
encounter also contains the payoff of being able to dominate another human
being, it will be doubly appealing. The history of sex and dominance dictates
a Hobbesian skepticism about the malleability of human nature.
A plague on the sociobiologists. We do not live in the state of nature,
and it is a good thing, too. Because whether there was or was not a social
contract moment when people agreed to leave the state of nature, it seems pretty
clear that we are better off in a civil society than in the state of nature. We
are better off not killing each other whenever the opportunity arises and all
the rest of the stuff. I suspect that what the sociobiologists really want is to
leave the state of nature with all the bad stuff behind (we do not see them
foregoing indoor plumbing, for example, although a necessity for flush toilets
would probably not have been an evolutionary advantage on the African
savannah so beloved of the sociobiologists), with the sole exception of sex
with dominance. And given the structural inequality between the genders,
we probably could have some heterosexual sex with dominance while foregoing
the war of all against all. To some extent, we did live like that for many years,
as the history of laws and mores invoking dominance reflects.
Still, even the most abusive sexual regime - cloistered women, tribal
enslavement, gift-giving - contains or limits the play of dominance somewhat.
Rape, for instance, is contained. While it was perfectly legal to rape your
wife in the United States until ten or twenty years ago, civil society contains
the desire to rape whoever comes along. After all, as the saying goes, maybe
"that was no lady, that was my wife." Where there is property or where there
are blood lines to be transmitted, unconstrained rape and adultery make the
picture very confusing. Moreover, if other-sex sexuality and same-sex sexuality
are distributed among the population in equal measures, attempting to dominate
someone of your size and weight involves certain risks not present in
heterosexual sexuality on average. So, moving from the sexual state of nature
to a sexually civil society has a lot of advantages not obvious at first glance,
and the regime of enforced female fidelity within monogamous marriage reflects
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the advantages of confining random sexual dominance. But absent the kick
of dominance, the problem could be that people - as the Foucauldians sug-
gest - would just as soon sit around under a tree.
And here we return to Calvin Klein and Michel Foucault. The social
construction of sexuality, I contend, does not just serve the agenda of the pow-
erful. It is a necessary effort by civil society to present a sexual vision sexy
enough to motivate people accustomed to dominance to have sex when domi-
nance is constrained. The Greeks constructed an elaborate description of men's
natural hierarchy over their wives, concubines, and prostitutes in ancient
Greece. The result? Men did not have to obtain the payoff of sexual domi-
nance by random acts of rape, as portrayed in the mythic period of Greek
culture. They established an elaborate social structure of sexual inequality
and convinced themselves that their social dominance over their wives and
companions was just as good. The private governance of women in the post-
Enlightenment years of "opposite sexes" and "separate spheres" had the same
agenda: As women emerged into equality under the influence of Protestantism
and the printing press, the sexual regime of dominance was reconstructed with
the language of separation. As women moved into social equality in the
twentieth century, especially in the United States, there was an explosion of
the most misogynistic and violent pornography. The centrality of cultural
mechanisms of synthetic sexual dominance like pornography to self-realization
for the beneficiaries of the dominance regime is reflected in the terms in which
they are defended. 17
The truth is, however, that socially destructive vehicles of dominance
for sexual functioning are a sign of impotence, not strength. The test of any
construction of sexuality, I assert, is not how successfully it re-introduces
dominance into civil society to incite sexuality for those who cannot feel sexual
without dominance. The test of the construction is how much sexuality it
constructs at the lowest price in dominance. Like hierarchical marriage,
pornography is better than unrestricted rape, but it is still a failure. In that
way, pornographic dominance in erotic literature is like swearing in a comedy
routine. Its very presence is a sign that the author lacks enough imagination
to inspire sexuality without violating the norms of civil society. Moreover,
the civility standard is rising as the oppressed people's willingness to tolerate
dominance dwindles with, for example, the falling from favor of the "naturally
submissive female" so beloved of early Victorian thinkers, the changing social
17. See MARTINH. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYsIs 11-12
(1984) (arguing that only true value of free speech is "individual self-realization"); Martin
H. Redish & Gary Lippman, Freedom of Expression and the Civic Republican Revival in
Constitutional Theory: The Ominous Implications, 79 CAL. L. REv. 267, 304-10 (1991) (de-
fending pornography as ideology).
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construction of childhood, and the attitude toward the sexual harvesting of
children.
By these tests, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century pornography, with its
feminine philosophers leading priapic clergymen and nobles on a merry-go-
round of improbable but titillating exchanges, is seditious and blasphemous. 1s
But from the standpoint of sexual politics, the works appear quite harmless -
and probably effective in inciting desire - or there would not have been such
a big market for it. 9 Thus, early pornography scores pretty well on the
standard of making people feel sexy without needing to make them - and
especially the naturally stronger men among them - feel dominant over their
sexual partner. Late twentieth-century hard-core pornography does not. This
brings me back to Calvin Klein.
Calvin Klein, normally so closely tuned to social constructions, missed
the boat with his impliedly pornographic jeans ads.' His pictures of models
looking just at the age of consent or a little under, his thinly veiled imitation
of kiddie pornography with the older male voice asking a young-looking boy
to describe his sexuality, invoked a notion of dominance unacceptable to the
mainstream, commercial American world.
And, I suggest, he made this mistake in part for the same reason that
feminists criticize Foucault. Klein and his advisors were thinking of an all-male
world, the world of same-sex transactions in which the level of sexual domi-
nance in the social construction may, in light of the relative equality of strength
and size, be acceptable at quite a different level. By applying the same-sex
standard of dominance to the construction of sexuality between adults and
children and between males and females, he ran right into the forces resisting
dominance-based sexual constructions. Society responded in very interesting
ways - with savage criticism in the market and threats of prosecution, to be
sure, but most interesting of all, with a stream of mockery worthy of the best
seventeenth-century blasphemous and seditious pornographic tradition. My
favorite example is the Cincinnati Post cartoon showing two very New York
older women with Bloomingdale's bags being flashed by a man in nothing
but bare feet and an open raincoat. "Don't worry," one lady says to the other,
"It's just one of those Calvin Klein ads."
Being compared to a dirty old man whose sex life is reduced to exposing
his private parts to unwilling witnesses on New York streets probably was
not what the ever-hip Calvin Klein people hoped to evoke. "What was the
matter with the Calvin Klein folks?," the mocking words and pictures all asked.
"Weren't they sexy enough to have sex without the props?"
18. See generally THE INVENTION OF PORNOGRAPHY (Lynn Hunt ed., 1993).
19. See generally ROBERT DARNTON, tDITION ET SEDITION (1991).
20. See Vicki Goldberg, Testing the Limits in a Culture of Excess, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
29, 1995, § 2 (Arts & Leisure), at 1.
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